¶ 1 Leave a comment on paragraph 1 0 The word ‘discourse’ seems to have become a fad in academia. More than twenty journals have the word ‘discourse’ in its title, and various book series as well. Numerous authors use the word ‘discourse’ in various ways, often without giving a clarification of what they exactly mean. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a more or less distinct approach within the broader field of discourse studies that emerged in the early 1990s with scholars such as Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, Theo van Leeuwen and Gunther Kress. Initially known as critical linguistics it has become widespread in social sciences and humanities (Wodak 2001: 4–9).
¶ 2 Leave a comment on paragraph 2 0 CDA takes its main inspiration from Michel Foucault. But, within the field of critical discourse analysis there is a difference between authors who strictly follow a Foucauldian spirit, and authors who go beyond Foucault. There are authors who are strictly text-oriented and others who focus on texts in contexts; authors who study the function of cognition and classification, and those who are interested in the social conditions and social effects of social classifications.
¶ 3 Leave a comment on paragraph 3 0 In this chapter I study the use and usefulness of the three-dimensional model of CDA as developed by Norman Fairclough (1992, 2001, 2003). I am not the first and not the only one to do so. Others are Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 60–95), Lock (2004) and Hjelm (2014). Heather (2000), Moberg (2016) and myself (Wijsen 2010), among others, used this approach in the academic study of religion.
¶ 4 Leave a comment on paragraph 4 0 I started to use CDA in 2007, in a research project on religious discourse, social cohesion and conflict, studying the ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric in three countries. I was able to employ three junior researchers who successfully completed their doctoral theses using critical discourse analysis. We focused on culturally salient key words to understand the discursive nature of societal changes in Tanzania (Wijsen & Ndaluka 2012), Indonesia (Wijsen & Cholil 2014), and The Netherlands (Wijsen & Vos 2015).
¶ 5 Leave a comment on paragraph 5 0 My contribution to the three-dimensional model is that I link CDA to Dialogical Self Theory (DST) as developed Hubert Hermans (Hermans, Hermans – Konopka 2010; Hermans 2018). Just as CDA, DST has got applications in a huge variety of disciplines (Hermans & Gieser 2012; Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 19–20), particularly also in the field that I am interested in, the study of multiple identities or multiple loyalties (König 2012; Buitelaar 2013a, 2013b; Zock 2010, 2013; Buitelaar & Zock 2013; Stock 2014).
¶ 6 Leave a comment on paragraph 6 0 Both approaches are rooted in social constructivism (Hjelm 2014) and share concepts such as “self” (the I, identity), “position” (the self as embodied, bound by space and time), “voice” (the self as narrative), “polyphony” (the multiplicity of voices in which I constitutes itself) and “dialogue” (the I constitutes itself in relations). But to the best of my knowledge, they have not been linked thus far.
¶ 7 Leave a comment on paragraph 7 0 In general, Fairclough (1992: 22–25) is critical of socio-psychological approaches. They take into account the inconsistency of the self, or the multiplicity of I-positions, but they neglect the social orientation of the self and have an individualistic bias. In this article I elaborate on a later version of DST that is capable of bringing together DST and CDA. My hypothesis is that linking CDA end DST is relevant particularly if scholars of religion deal with multiple identities or multiple loyalties. Both approaches deal with “different selves” (Fairclough 1992: 25; Fairclough 2003: 181), or “multivoicednes” of the self (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 3; Hermans 2010: 3) and link micro (individual) and macro (societal) level analyses, mediated by meso level (institutional) analysis.
¶ 8 Leave a comment on paragraph 8 0 My aim is to explore strengths and weaknesses of both approaches, particularly for understanding identification and integration in multicultural societies. This has been problematized as the “multicultural drama”: a strong national, ethnic or religious identification by immigrants promotes their segregation and hinders their integration in the modern Dutch society (Scheffer 2010: 55-61). This is what we dealt with in the third project mentioned above (Wijsen & Vos, 2014, 2015; Wijsen 2016).
¶ 9 Leave a comment on paragraph 9 0 In what follows I first explain the conceptual frameworks of both CDA and DST. Next I follow the three stages of CDA (analysis of text, intertextuality and context), show the conceptual equivalents in DST, and test the usefulness of combining the two for the study of identification and integration of immigrants, using a sample from my fieldwork on the multicultural drama rhetoric in The Netherlands. I close with conclusion and discussion.
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis
¶ 10 Leave a comment on paragraph 10 0 Fairclough (1992: 99) presents a “three-dimensional framework for discourse analysis” and uses “a variety of theoretical perspectives and methods”. This is what I elaborate on in this section. According to Fairclough (1992: 56) discourse has three levels, namely the interpersonal, the institutional and the societal level, and has three functions, namely “subject positions”, “social relations”, and “systems of knowledge and belief”. Moreover, in his view discourse analysis is based on three assumptions and three traditions and it has three stages.
¶ 11 Leave a comment on paragraph 11 0 Throughout the book Fairclough gives parent—child relations, pupil—teacher relations and doctor—patient relations as examples. From Foucault, Fairclough (1992: 3) takes medical practice as an example of how discourses structure areas of knowledge. From Habermas, Fairclough (1992: 6) takes the colonization of the ‘life world’ by economic and political systems.
Discourse has three levels
¶ 12 Leave a comment on paragraph 12 0 According to Fairclough (1992: 56) discourse has three levels. First there is the micro level or the interpersonal level. Second there is the meso level or the institutional level. Third there is the macro level or the societal level.
¶ 13 Leave a comment on paragraph 13 0 For example, first of all family interaction exists as an interpersonal relationship between parents and children. But, the positions of ‘father’, ‘mother’, ‘child’ go beyond the individuals and are based on conventions which are more or less shared and formalised, for example in family law (Fairclough 1992: 65). Moreover, these positions and conventions are embedded in wider societal processes of democratization and commercialization.
¶ 14 Leave a comment on paragraph 14 0 Class room communication is foremost a communication between the lecturer and the students (interpersonal level). But, their communication is related to and influenced by faculty and university regulations, such as education and examination regulation (institutional level) but also by the ministry of education and accreditation boards and ultimately maybe even by world economy which influences whether there are funds available (societal level).
Discourse has three functions
¶ 15 Leave a comment on paragraph 15 0 According to Fairclough (1992: 8, 10, 64), discourse has three functions or aspects of constitutive effects, namely subject positions or social identities (‘selves’), social relations (‘structures of dialogue’) , and social cognitions, this is shared knowledge or systems of ideas and beliefs (‘mental maps’). The ideational function of a text is the way the texts signifies the world. The ideational function can become ideological (see above).
¶ 16 Leave a comment on paragraph 16 0 For example, class room communication positions the participants as lecturer and students. There are various modes of being a lecturer and a student. But, so long as their relation is defined as class room communication they cannot change their positions. Their positions and relations may change if they meet outside class, for example in a soccer competition or a prayer service.
¶ 17 Leave a comment on paragraph 17 0 Moreover, they have mental models about what a good lecturer is, or how a good student should behave. These ideas may change in harmony with the definition of what type of class they are in, and this influences the relation they have. At a lecture, students expect the lecturer to speak a lot and the lecturer expects them to listen and make notes. In a seminar, the lecturer expects the students to speak; and the students expect the lecturer to listen to them.
Discourse analysis starts from three assumptions
¶ 18 Leave a comment on paragraph 18 0 Discourse analysis starts from three assumptions (Fairclough 1992: 71–72). The first assumption is that discourse is a practice. Discourse ‘does’ things just as other practices, this means: discourse has effects. Discourse not only reflects but constitutes entities and relations. What makes discourse different from other practice is its linguistic form.
¶ 19 Leave a comment on paragraph 19 0 The second assumption is that constitutive effects, or the relation between language use and social reality, are mediated through discursive practices, this is the production, distribution and consumption of text. The third assumption is that the relation between language use and social reality is dialectic. This is to say, language use influences social reality and the other way around.
¶ 20 Leave a comment on paragraph 20 0 According to Fairclough (1992: 72, 80) the central concern of critical discourse analysis is to trace explanatory connections between the way texts are put together (linguistic practice) and the social structures and struggles they are embedded in (social practice), and the way these connections are mediated through processes of production, distribution and consumption (discursive practice).
Discourse analysis draws on three traditions
¶ 21 Leave a comment on paragraph 21 0 Discourse analysis draws on three traditions (Fairclough 1992: 72, 85), namely linguistic analysis of texts, macro-sociological analysis of social practice in relation to social structure (context), and micro sociological analysis of interaction based on the interpretative tradition.
¶ 22 Leave a comment on paragraph 22 0 For the linguistic part, Fairclough depends on the systemic grammar of Halliday and the speech act theory of Austin. For the micro sociology, he draws on ethno-methodology and conversation analysis of Garfinkel and Goffman. For macro sociology, Fairclough draws on critical theory scholars such as Habermas, Giddens and Bourdieu.
¶ 23 Leave a comment on paragraph 23 0 Fairclough (1992: 72–73) accepts the interpretative claim that analysts must understand participants’ perspectives. But participants’ perspectives shape and are shaped by social structures. They are heterogeneous and contradictory and contested in struggles which are at least partly discursive in nature. By doing so Fairclough (1992: 226) tries to combine and bridge humanities and social sciences.
Discourse analysis has three dimensions
¶ 24 Leave a comment on paragraph 24 0 Discourse analysis has three dimensions or stages (Fairclough 1992: 56, 73, 198–199, 231). The first stage is the analysis of discourse as linguistic practice, or the analysis of the formal features of text. The second stage is the analysis of discourse as discursive practice, or the analysis of the production, distribution and consumption of text. The third stage is the analysis of discourse as social practice, or the analysis of the social conditions and social effects of text. Alternatively, these stages are called the analysis of “text”, “interaction” and “context”, or “description”, “interpretation” and “explanation” (Fairclough 2001: 21).
¶ 25 Leave a comment on paragraph 25 0 In a nutshell, this is the three-dimensional concept of discourse. According to Fairclough (1992: 73, 169, 231) overlaps are unavoidable. The analyst makes an in-depth investigation of a limited number of discourse samples and looks at them at different levels and from various perspectives at several stages which are not exclusive but complementary.
Hermans’ dialogical self theory
¶ 26 Leave a comment on paragraph 26 0 Earlier I noted that I started to use CDA in a research project studying the ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric 2007. In that same year I finished another research project studying interreligious relation in East Africa. I was interested in understanding how people could say that they were hundred percent African and hundred percent Christian, whereas to me there was an inconsistency in such a statement. I was interested to understand how people easily could convert from being a Christian to being a Muslim, and the other way around. I could not understand this flexibility from the theory that I was then working with, the Social Identity Theory. Thus I explored another theory, the Dialogical Self Theory (Wijsen 2007: 145, 176).
Theoretical starting points
¶ 27 Leave a comment on paragraph 27 0 This theory combines the concepts of self and dialogue that come from two sources, American pragmatism and Russian dialogism (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 1; Hermans 2018: 9).
¶ 28 Leave a comment on paragraph 28 0 First there is William James’ notion of the extended self. James goes beyond the separation of self and environment (by Descartes) and distinguishes between ‘I’ and ‘me.’ ‘I’ is the self as knower or subject; and ‘me’ is the self as known or object. The self as known is composed of all that the person can call his or her own: my body, my clothes, my house, my wife, my children, i.e. people and things in the environment belong to the self to the extent that they are felt as mine (Hermans 2018: 77–79).
¶ 29 Leave a comment on paragraph 29 0 Second there is Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of the polyphonic novel. Analyzing Dostojevski’s publications, Bakhtin argued that in these publications there is not one author at work, namely Dostojevski himself, but a multiplicity of authors that are represented by the characters. In addition there is a plurality of voices, which is later coined ‘intertextuality’ by Kristeva (1986).
¶ 30 Leave a comment on paragraph 30 0 DST has a conceptual framework (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 1–20) that has some equivalence with CDA. First there is the “self”. The self is part of the society, it does not have an existence separate from society. The self can be conceived of as a dynamic multiplicity of I-positions. It is a ‘mini-society’ or a ‘society of mind’. Second there is “position”. The I is embodied and bound to particular positions in time and space. The embodied I is able to move from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time.
¶ 31 Leave a comment on paragraph 31 0 Third there is “voice”. Positions can be voiced, or performed linguistically. The voices behave like interacting characters in a story or movie. Each of them has a story to tell about their own experiences from their own perspective. Fourth there is “polyphony”. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, and these positions are involved in relationships of dominance and power. When the self functions as a multiplicity of unrelated I-positions, a confusing cacophony of voices emerges.
¶ 32 Leave a comment on paragraph 32 0 Central to the theory is the notion of “dialogue”. The polyphonic self is dialogical in that internal dialogues within the self and external dialogues with actual others are both needed in order to reach a cross-fertilization of the mini-society of the self and the macro-society at large.
¶ 33 Leave a comment on paragraph 33 0 DST assumes first that the self can be conceived of as a (mini) ‘society of mind’ or a multiplicity of embodied I-positions among which dialogical relationship exists. I-positions can be internal (e.g. “I as dreamer”) or external (e.g. “the voice of my mother”), as parts of the extended self (Hermans 2018: 53, 65). Internal I-positions can be personal (“I as a Muslim”) or collective (“we as Muslims”). In multicultural societies, dialogical relationships are not only required between individuals, but also within one and the same individual (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 1)
¶ 34 Leave a comment on paragraph 34 0 The second assumption of the dialogical self theory of that the ‘I’ is capable of shifting from one position to another in accordance with different, even contradictory, situations. I-positions do not act in isolation. Like individuals and groups in democratic societies, I-positions can make compromises and form coalitions (Hermans 2018: 67). If various voices in the self are in harmony with each other, the self is polyphonic. If the voices are conflicting and contradicting each other without agreement or compromise there is cacophony.
¶ 35 Leave a comment on paragraph 35 0 Having given the conceptual framework of both theories, in the three sections that follow I will first explain the technical framework of CDA, second I do the same for DST, and third I combine them in analysing samples taken from my case study on identification and integration of immigrants in the Netherlands, conducted between 2012 and 2016. I follow the three-dimensional model of analysis of CDA (Fairclough 1992: 73; Fairclough 2001: 21). This comes close to the three-step model of analysis of multivoicedness developed from DST perspective (Aveling, Gillespie & Cornish 2015; Bourke, de Abreu & Rathbone 2018). Only its third step is clearly different from the third dimension of CDA. From the above mentioned case study I select a corpus of 21 interviews with Indonesian Muslims, deposited to the Netherlands’ Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS), and I focus on samples where the dilemma between identification and integration is at stake.
The analysis of ‘text’
¶ 36 Leave a comment on paragraph 36 0 In this section I deal with the first stage of CDA, the analysis of discourse as ‘linguistic practice’, or the formal features of text and talk. This stage is the implementation of the first assumption mentioned above. Discourse is a practice just as any other practice; it ‘does’ things. The only difference is its linguistic form. From a DST perspective this stage entails identifying I labels or I statements.
Wording, over-wording an re-wording
¶ 37 Leave a comment on paragraph 37 0 In Fairclough’s work, most attention is given to aspects related to vocabulary (Fairclough 1992: 76–77). “It is sometimes useful for analytic purposes to focus upon a single word”, says Fairclough (1992: 185), or upon “alternative wordings and their political and ideological significance” (Fairclough 1992: 77). This is done by comparison (Fairclough 1992:193).
¶ 38 Leave a comment on paragraph 38 0 The political and ideological function of discourse comes back in the third stage of the analysis. According to Fairclough, words are never neutral; they serve political and ideological agendas. For example, in Dutch it makes a difference whether speakers refer to ‘new-comers’ (immigrants) as buitenlanders (foreigners) or medelanders (compatriots). It does make a difference when newcomers refer to themselves ‘Moroccan Dutch’, or ‘Dutch of Moroccan descent’.
¶ 39 Leave a comment on paragraph 39 0 In social science, there is a long tradition of focusing on culturally salient ‘key words’ (Fairclough 1992: 185–194). The meaning of words or the wording of meaning is not individual but social, and words are not neutral but politically or ideologically invested. For example, the word ‘enterprise’ is related to the neo-liberal agenda.
¶ 40 Leave a comment on paragraph 40 0 Hegemonic practice tends to present the dominant wording as the only one. But there is always a multiplicity in ways of wording or alternative wording. For example, immigration as influx or flood as opposed to immigration as a quest for a better life.
¶ 41 Leave a comment on paragraph 41 0 It is useful to compare the wording of different domains in terms of relative density, that is, in terms of the number of different wordings, many of which are almost synonymous (similarity), for example: mastery, skill, competence, expertise. This is over-wording. Over-wording shows intense preoccupation pointing to the peculiarities of the group that uses these words, e.g. technical language in education.
¶ 42 Leave a comment on paragraph 42 0 In addition to over-wording, rewording is generating new wordings which are set up as alternatives to, and in opposition to, the existing ones (contrasts). For example, the use of inclusive language in contrast to sexist or racist language, chairperson instead of chairman, indigenous instead of black people.
Personal position repertoire
¶ 43 Leave a comment on paragraph 43 0 In DST, the main analytical tool at descriptive level is the personal position repertoire (Hermans 2018: 283–284). The analyst looks at clauses in which the speaker positions or identifies him- or herself as I, for example ‘I as a Muslim’, or ‘I am a Dutch of Moroccan descent’. An I-position is a position in which one puts himself towards other positions internally in the self (e.g. “I as rational scientist”; “I as intuitive dancer”) or externally towards the positions of other people in the world (e.g. “the voice of my dominant mother”, “the hands of my empathic father”).
¶ 44 Leave a comment on paragraph 44 0 Referring to Bakhtin, Hermans and Hermans Konopka (2010: 131) hold that “other beings exist within selves: through the language and tools that we use”. According to them, positions can be voiced. However, the concept of ‘position’ is more fundamental than the concept of ‘voice’. The concept of voice as the instrument of speech is intrinsically connected with the use of language and signs. But, people already occupy a position before they learn to speak (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka 2010: 226–228).
Islam is just the perfect belief
¶ 45 Leave a comment on paragraph 45 0 Despite different priorities, both CDA and DST use Bakhtin’s notion of voice and multi-voicedness. In my study of identification and integration of Indonesian Muslims in The Netherlands some interviewees say that Indonesian Muslims are “more open” and “more flexible” than “other Muslims” who are “more strict”. “More than Moroccans and Turks, we easily adjust to modern life in the Netherlands.” Other interviewees say that they do not like it when people say that Indonesian Muslims are better integrated than Muslims from Turkey or Morocco, because the Islam of Indonesians is “more modern” than that of other Muslims. One of them said,
¶ 46 Leave a comment on paragraph 46 0 Islam is just the perfect belief; what is it that could change? I mean, when you say [that you make Islam] modern, you imply that it [Islam] has [been] changed to make it up-to-date.
¶ 47 Leave a comment on paragraph 47 0 Young Indonesian Muslims tend to label themselves as “more Muslim,” while on the other hand, as “more Dutch”. According to them, this makes their integration easier. Being “more Muslim” and “more Dutch” is not perceived as a contradiction or inconsistency. In terms of DST: ‘perfect Muslim’ and ‘modern Dutch’ are different I-positions or voices of themselves. They don’t think in terms of ‘either–or’, but of ‘both–and’.
¶ 48 Leave a comment on paragraph 48 0 Youngsters themselves identify their interpretation of Islam as purer—that is to say, free of cultural ballast. A second-generation Indonesian Muslim says that he has a stronger bond with people who are also Muslim, because “one understands each other more easily.” Referring to his Moroccan girlfriend, he says,
¶ 49 Leave a comment on paragraph 49 0 She is really a person who is very non-traditional Islamic, but very much focused on what Islam is, and not on what belongs to a certain country or culture. She is very anti-Moroccan Islam, because there is so much tradition to it.
¶ 50 Leave a comment on paragraph 50 0 “Non-traditional” Islamic is not used as “modern” Islamic. The re-wording of “tradition,” “non-traditional Islamic,” and “much tradition,” as well as equating the phrases “non-traditional Islam” and “anti-Moroccan,” shows that “tradition” does not refer to belief (Islam), but to culture (Morocco).
¶ 51 Leave a comment on paragraph 51 0 He uses the word “traditional” in a way that is opposite to the way Dutch people and scholars of integration discourses use the word “traditional”. In the interviewee’s usage, “non-traditional” Islam does not mean “modern” Islam, but rather “orthodox” Islam, “perfect ” Islam, an Islam that is free from customs and cultural traditions.
The analysis of ‘intertextuality’
¶ 52 Leave a comment on paragraph 52 0 In this section I deal with the second stage of CDA, the analysis of discourse as discursive practice. This is the implementation of the second assumption mentioned above. The relation between language and reality is mediated through discursive practice, this is the production, distribution and consumption of text. From DST perspective this stage entails identifying the voices of ‘inner-Others’.
¶ 53 Leave a comment on paragraph 53 0 According to CDA, when people produce (communicate) and consume (interpret) text they draw on other texts (Fairclough 1992: 82, 83) which are stored in their long-term memory (Fairclough 2001: 8–9). These resources are cognitive in the sense that they are in people’s heads. They are social in the sense that they have social conditions and social effects (Fairclough 2001: 20). This is what we deal with in the next stage.
¶ 54 Leave a comment on paragraph 54 0 In this stage Fairclough (2003: 42 Fairclough 1992: 102) explicitly draws on Bakhtin’s dialogical theory. Texts are inevitable und unavoidably dialogical in the sense that “any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of utterances” with which it “enters into one kind of relation or anther”.
¶ 55 Leave a comment on paragraph 55 0 There are different forms of intertextuality (Fairclough 1992: 118). Manifest intertextuality is at stake when other texts are explicitly drawn upon in a text. Indirect intertextuality happens when texts are drawn upon in a tacit way. Intertextuality has horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal dimension implies that texts that are drawn upon are contemporary; the vertical dimension implies that texts are historical (Fairclough 1992: 101–103).
¶ 56 Leave a comment on paragraph 56 0 According DST, dialogical relationship not only exists between individuals, be they past or present, but also within the self of one and the same individual (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 1). I-positions are external or internal. Internal I-positions can be personal or collective.
¶ 57 Leave a comment on paragraph 57 0 DST assumes that the polyphonic self is dialogical in the sense that internal dialogues within the self and external dialogues with actual others are both needed in order to reach a cross-fertilization of the mini-society of the self and the macro-society at large.
A ‘burka’ is really something Afghan
¶ 58 Leave a comment on paragraph 58 0 Both CDA and DST acknowledge “different selves” (Fairclough 1992: 25), or the “multivoicednes” of the self (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 3; Hermans 2018: 373). From a CDA perspective the basic analytic question in this stage is: “whose voice is this” (Fairclough 1992: 105)? Or, whose voice is reproduced, contested or transformed?
¶ 59 Leave a comment on paragraph 59 0 Most interviewees refer to the negative image of Islam in the mass media and political discourses, or the assumed incompatibility of Islam and modernity. But they “keep calm”, and they “don’t express themselves in the media”. They say that the incompatibility of Islam and modernity does not apply to them, because they are “already adjusted” to the modern society, they “are different” (compared to Moroccans or Turks), and they “do not react emotionally” (as Moroccans and Turks do). Thus, in identifying and positioning themselves they constantly refer to how they are positioned in the mass media and the political discourse, distancing themselves from other Muslims (Moroccans and Turks).
¶ 60 Leave a comment on paragraph 60 0 The interviewee who said that “Islam is just the perfect belief”, criticized Muslims who separate faith and daily life to adjust to the modern society. He spoke about them as “part-time Muslims” or “spare time Muslims”, and called them “Muslims by name only”. By doing so he implicitly drew on an Indonesian distinction between santri and abangan, or those who are serious about their belief (literally ‘learned’) and those who are not.
¶ 61 Leave a comment on paragraph 61 0 The Indonesian Muslim who spoke about his Moroccan girlfriend being “anti-traditional” implicitly draws upon a colonial distinction between agama (religion) and adat (culture, tradition). In colonial discourse the word adat was used for customs that were considered incompatible with Christian civilization. He and his Moroccan girlfriend refer to a burka as metaphor.
¶ 62 Leave a comment on paragraph 62 0 A burka is really something Afghan [culture], and anyway has nothing to do with Islam [religion]. As Muslims we are obliged to smile and greet each other in a friendly way, and you cannot see this [smile] when you wear such a thing on your face.
¶ 63 Leave a comment on paragraph 63 0 Moreover, in saying “Islam is just the perfect belief”, the interviewee refers to a distinction between Islam and Muslims. Islam is pure and cannot fail, but Muslims can fail.
¶ 64 Leave a comment on paragraph 64 0 In talking about integration and adjusting to the Dutch situation, Indonesian Muslims explicitly refer to the multicultural situation at home and the state philosophy of unity in diversity. As one of them said , “we are already multicultural”, and “we are used to adjust to others.”
The analysis of context
¶ 65 Leave a comment on paragraph 65 0 In this section I deal with the third stage of CDA, the analysis of discourse as social practice, or the social conditions and social effects of the texts. This is the implementation of the third assumption mentioned above: discourse ‘does’ things, it has effects. This third stage in CDA differs from the third stage in DST. Whereas the third stage in DST is focused on interactions between the voices in the self (Bourke et al. 2018: 6), the third stage in CDA is focused on interactions between ‘text’ and ‘context’ (Fairclough 2001: 21–22).
Reproduction, contestation or transformation
¶ 66 Leave a comment on paragraph 66 0 As mentioned above, Fairclough (1992: 64, 238) distinguishes three functions or aspects of the constructive effects of discourse. These are “social identity” or “subject positions”, “social relationships” and “systems of knowledge and belief”. These are reproduced, contested or transformed in discourse (Fairclough 1992: 10).
¶ 67 Leave a comment on paragraph 67 0 A major concern of the book is the subject constitution through texts (Fairclough 1992: 105, 168) which is in harmony with Foucault. According to Fairclough subjects do not pre-exist but are constituted through texts. And this insight is expanded to all social realities, including institutions and even societies (Fairclough 1992: 133).
¶ 68 Leave a comment on paragraph 68 0 Discourses are ideological “in so far as they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations”, says Fairclough (1992: 91). According to him, hegemony means “constructing alliances, and integrating rather than dominating subordinate classes” (Fairclough 1992: 92). This is in harmony with his “dialectic view” (Fairclough 1992: 93).
¶ 69 Leave a comment on paragraph 69 0 The ideologies embedded in discursive practices are most effective when they become naturalized, and achieve the status of common sense (Fairclough 1992: 67, 87), or taken-for- granted truth. For example, in a neo-liberal era unemployment is presented as natural disaster or fate instead of a consequence of human decisions. Also, manager and secretary, or teacher and pupil interactions are ideologically informed by democracy (Fairclough 1992: 89–90; 201-207).
¶ 70 Leave a comment on paragraph 70 0 But, this property of ideologies should not be overstated as ideologies and the relations of domination expressed in them are also contested, redefined and reshaped. Discursive practices are also ideological struggles in which power relations are transformed (Fairclough 1992: 87–88).
¶ 71 Leave a comment on paragraph 71 0 This again shows the dialectical nature of the relation between discourse and reality. Althusser overstates that subjects are positioned in discourse. According to Fairclough (1992: 91), subjects are shaped by and they shape ideology. And that is why according to Fairclough (1992: 58), Gramsci’s hegemony is superior to Foucault’s power.
¶ 72 Leave a comment on paragraph 72 0 In conclusion, Fairclough (1992: 223) distinguishes three models of discursive practice, the unilinear, the hegemonic and the mosaic model. The unilinear model is characterised by ongoing colonization, the hegemonic model by struggle and the mosaic model by fragmentation. Developing a hegemonic model of discursive practice has been a major objective of the book Discourse and Social Change (Fairclough 1992: 224).
Democratic self in democratic society
¶ 73 Leave a comment on paragraph 73 0 According to DST, “a democratic organisation of the self adds value to both the self and society in their interconnectedness” (Hermans 2018: 4). The metaphor of “democracy” is illuminating. Just as people negotiate and compromise with opponents in democratic societies, in the democratic self there is room for a dialogue with opposing internal I-positions. In the democratic self, different I-positions are enriching each other without letting any position to overrule other ones (Hermans 2018: 6–7).
¶ 74 Leave a comment on paragraph 74 0 Just as in democratic societies, some positions place themselves against other positions in the self (anti positions). Other positions promote the coordination of various positions in the self (promoter positions). Sometimes positions are exaggerated to a agree that the balance in the self is lost (over-positioning). In other cases, positions allow a helicopter view over other positions and the relationships between them (meta-positions).
I see myself always as a world citizen
¶ 75 Leave a comment on paragraph 75 0 Both CDA and DST speak in terms of “positions”, “subject positions” (in CDA) or “I-positions” (in DST) as effect of positioning, and being positioned (Hermans 2018: 47).
¶ 76 Leave a comment on paragraph 76 0 In my study of identification and integration of Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands, all interviewees positioned themselves (individual I-position) and their group (collective I-position) as being “more open-minded” than Moroccans and Turks. Whereas some of them said that they “adjusted” to modern society by separating faith and daily life (e.g. by not wearing a head scarf), most said that there is no need to separate faith and daily life, because Islam is completely compatible with modern life.
¶ 77 Leave a comment on paragraph 77 0 Moreover, integration into modern Dutch society does not require less Islam, but rather more Islam, pure Islam. The interviewee who said that “Islam is just the perfect belief”, said “I see myself always as a world citizen”. Asked what he says when people ask him if he is Indonesian, Dutch, or Muslim, another interviewee says:
¶ 78 Leave a comment on paragraph 78 0 I think I would say Muslim, because being a Muslim is not bound to a specific country. Yes, being Muslim is most important for me. It gives me a platform to be world citizen.
¶ 80 Leave a comment on paragraph 80 0 My analysis shows that young Indonesian Muslims in The Netherlands do not want to be either Dutch or Indonesian, but rather global or world citizens. For them, “perfect” Islam, or “non-traditional” is an Islam that is not bound by local tradition. Islam as a universal religion provides a platform to be “citizens of the world”. In DST terms, Islam is a “promoter position”, a position that gives direction to other positions in the position repertoire (Hermans 2018: 65–71). Or, in terms of CDA, it is an “ethos” that controls the construction of a particular version of the self out of all possible versions of the self (Fairclough 1992: 166–67).
Conclusion and discussion
¶ 81 Leave a comment on paragraph 81 0 This chapter aimed at testing the hypothesis that linking CDA and DST is relevant for scholars of religion who deal with multiple identities or multiple loyalties in multicultural societies. Both Hermans (b. 1937) and Fairclough (b. 1941) made their break-through around the 1990’s, and provide “bridging theories” with a link to Bakhtin. Fairclough bridges language studies and critical theory. Hermans bridges pragmatism and dialogism. Both CDA and DST make use of linguistic data (text and talk) and deal with multiple identities in terms of “different selves” (Fairclough 1992: 25; Fairclough 2003: 181) or “polyphonic selves” (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010; Hermans 2018).
¶ 82 Leave a comment on paragraph 82 0 Both approaches turned to globalisation relatively late. Whereas Hermans was primarily focused on personality, Fairclough was focused on nationality. For both, the implications of globalization or internationalization came late. Fairclough (2001: 203–218) added a chapter on globalisation to the second edition of his Language and Power (first published in 1989). Hermans added this dimension in his book co-authored with Hermans-Konopka (2010).
¶ 83 Leave a comment on paragraph 83 0 Both make use of “self”, “voice” and “dialogue” as key concepts. But there are also notable differences between the two approaches. Whereas “voice” can be defined as a “language performance”, it is theorized in two different ways: as an “individual accomplishment”, and as a “social/cultural construction” (Sperling 2011: 71). Whereas Hermans mainly represents the former position, Fairclough mainly represent the latter.
¶ 84 Leave a comment on paragraph 84 0 Both CDA and DST conceptualize the relationship between personality and social identity (Fairclough 2003: 160, 182). CDA emphasizes social identity, or the society in the self, DST emphasizes personality, or the self-in-society. In principle, both CDA and DST agree that these approaches do not exclude each other.
¶ 85 Leave a comment on paragraph 85 0 In comparison to Hermans, Fairclough is less concerned with the dialogue between different positions within the self (Hermans, Hermans-Konopka 2010: 1). As an example of “different selves” he gives “various Mr Blairs” (Fairclough 2003: 181–183). He sees Mr Blair’s personality as a “mix of identities” but he does not conceptualize the dialogue between “various Mr Blairs” (Fairclough 2003: 182–183). Better than CDA, DST succeeds in explaining that the “others” are not “strangers” but already part of “me”, and that a dialogue between various “others” within the self is a condition for dialogue with “others” in the society (Hermans 2018: 4, 139). This is a strong point of DST that can enrich CDA studies on identification and integration in multicultural an democratic societies.
¶ 86 Leave a comment on paragraph 86 0 Both CDA and DST conceptualize the relationship between wording (voice) and positioning. Hermans (2018: 53) emphasizes the positioning of the self. For him the society is a metaphor for understanding how the self functions (Hermans 2018: 65). Combining linguistics with critical theory, Fairclough emphasizes that the self is positioned in discourse. Whereas in Hermans’ theory, positioning is prior to voice (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka 2010: 226–228), and the self is conceptualised “on a deeper prelinguistic level” (Hermans 2018: 51), Fairclough (1992: 137) focuses on “the construction of ‘the self’ in discourse”. For him, discourse is constitutive of the self (Fairclough 1992: 3, 39, 55, 105, 168).
¶ 87 Leave a comment on paragraph 87 0 Fairclough (1992: 133) takes the position that “intertextuality, and constantly changing intertextual relations in discourse, are central to an understanding of processes of subject constitution. This is so on a biographical time-scale, during the life of an individual, and for the constitution and reconstitution of social groups and communities”.
¶ 88 Leave a comment on paragraph 88 0 In the analysis of my interviews it is clear that the shift from “integration retaining identity” to “assimilation” in the “multicultural drama” discourse is constitutive for how Indonesian Muslims construct their “selves’ in the Netherlands.
¶ 89 Leave a comment on paragraph 89 0 On a more fundamental level, there is quite some evidence for the theory that the language that people are taught to speak from their childhood onwards structures the way they think and act. Therefore, scholars who study multiple identities or multiple loyalties from DST perspective (König 2012; Buitelaar 2013a, 2013b; Zock 2010, 2013; Buitelaar & Zock 2013; Stock 2014) could benefit from the CDA focus on text-analysis (Fairclough 1992: 2), moving from storey-telling or narrative analysis to discursive analysis.
¶ 91 Leave a comment on paragraph 91 0 Bourke, K., G. de Abreu & C. Rathbone (2018). “I’m just who I am”. Self-continuity and the Dialogical Self in a Study of Migrants. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 1–18.
¶ 92 Leave a comment on paragraph 92 0 Buitelaar, M. (2013a). Constructing a Muslim Self in a Post-migration Context: Continuity and Discontinuity with Parental Voices. In M. Buitelaar and H. Zock eds., Religious Voices in Self-Narratives: Making Sense of Life in Times of Transition,. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 241–274.
¶ 93 Leave a comment on paragraph 93 0 Buitelaar, M. 2013b. Dialogical Constructions of a Muslim Self through Life Story Telling. In Religious Stories We Live By: Narrative Approaches in Theology and Religious Studies, In R. Ganzevoort, M. de Haardt, M. Scherer-Rath eds.. Leiden: Brill1, 43–55.
¶ 94 Leave a comment on paragraph 94 0 Buitelaar, M., & H. Zock (2013). Introduction: Religious Voices in Self-Narratives. In M. Buitelaar and H. Zock eds., Religious Voices in Self-Narratives: Making Sense of Life in Times of Transition,. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 1–7.
¶ 101 Leave a comment on paragraph 101 0 Hermans, H. & A. Hermans-Konopka (2010). Dialogical Self Theory: Positioning and Counter-Positioning in a Globalizing Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
¶ 107 Leave a comment on paragraph 107 0 Moberg, M. (2016). Exploring the Spread of Marketization Discourse in the Nordic Folk Church context. In F. Wijsen & K. Von Stuckrad (eds.) Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion. Leiden – Boston: Brill, 239–259.
¶ 110 Leave a comment on paragraph 110 0 Stock, F. (2014). Speaking of Home. Home and identity in the multivoiced narratives of descendants of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Groningen.
¶ 112 Leave a comment on paragraph 112 0 Wijsen, F. (2010). Discourse Analysis in Religious Studies. The Case of Interreligious Worship in Friesland. Anthropos. International Review of Anthropology and Linguistics, 105(2), 539–553.
¶ 113 Leave a comment on paragraph 113 0 Wijsen, F. (2016). Indonesian Muslim or World Citizen? Religious Identity in the Dutch Integration Discourse. In F. Wijsen & K. Von Stuckrad (eds.) Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion. Leiden – Boston: Brill, 225–238.
¶ 114 Leave a comment on paragraph 114 0 Wijsen, F. & T. Ndaluka (2012). ‘Ujamaa is still alive’. A sign of Hope for Africa? In Bwangatto, A. (ed.), Africa is not Destined to die. Signs of Hope and Renewal. The Fifth International Conference on Africa,. Nairobi: Paulines Publications, 240–253.
¶ 115 Leave a comment on paragraph 115 0 Wijsen, F. & S. Cholil (2014). ‘I come from a Pancasila Family’. Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. In V. Küster & R. Setio (eds.), Muslim Christian Relations Observed. Comparative Studies from Indonesia and The Netherlands, Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 29–46.
¶ 116 Leave a comment on paragraph 116 0 Wijsen, F. & J. Vos (2015). ‘Rice and Rice with Sambal’. Indonesians and Moluccans in The Netherlands. In C. Sterkens & P. Vermeer (eds.), Religion, Migration and Conflict, Zürich: LIT Verlag, 53–71.
¶ 117 Leave a comment on paragraph 117 0 Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and its development. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis. London: Sage Publications.
¶ 118 Leave a comment on paragraph 118 0 Zock, H. (2010). “Voicing the Self in Postsecular Society: A Psychological Perspective on Meaning-making and Collective Identities.” In Exploring the Postsecular: The Religious, the Political and the Urban, edited by A. Molendijk, J. Beaumont, and C. Jedan, 131–44. Leiden – Boston: Brill.
¶ 119 Leave a comment on paragraph 119 0 Zock, H. (2013). “Religious Voices in the Dialogical Self: Towards a Conceptual-Analytical Framework on the Basis of Hubert Hermans’s Dialogical Self Theory.” In Religious Voices in Self-Narratives: Making Sense of Life in Times of Transition, edited by M. Buitelaar and H. Zock, 11–35. Berlin – Boston: De Gruyter.