Hans G. Kippenberg: Dynamics of the Human Rights Discourse on Freedom of Religion―observed from the Angle of Religious Studies
¶ 1 Leave a comment on paragraph 1 0 This essay is based on a study that was inspired by the article on religious freedom in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and its repercussions to which, up to now, little attention has been paid by scholars of religion. The juridification of religious freedom led to an expansion of the legal domain and to an intertwinement of law and religion. I investigated it from the perspective of a regulation of religious plurality in society. In this paper I want to address the legal discourse inside the UN on freedom of religion that developed in continuous contact with an independent field of actions and institutions, people claimed as religious. Studying the legal framing of religion sheds light on attempts to regulate the religious field in times, when intolerance and violence pervade it. Just as the freedom of the market functions only on the presupposition that the movement of goods is regulated (currency; money; wages; measurements; rules to prevent monopolies, etc.), so too the freedom of religion, as declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, requires a discourse on regulations. Already the fundamental Article 18 introduced rules of regulation.
Article 18: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
¶ 2 Leave a comment on paragraph 2 0 Article 18 constructs religion as a social phenomenon that is in need of a legal right to be manifested in the public sphere of society; every citizen is entitled to manifest religion in public―not only office-bearers of church and theology, but every citizen, either alone or in community with others; also a change of religion is right and proper.
¶ 3 Leave a comment on paragraph 3 0 Four manifestations are specified: teaching, practice, worship, and observance. These notions refer to practices in the realm of religion. Both religion and law are independent of each other, but are able to conceive of actions of the other in their own terms. Both are cultural systems. As Clifford Geertz formulated: “Law … is part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real”. The legal representations confront religion with distinctions that are not its own, Niklas Luhmann observes. Law happens to either legalize religious manifestations or to reject them as illegal. Article 18 regards religious plurality in a society or nation-state as normal, and sees it as a building block of every genuine democracy. The secular nation-state is responsible to guarantee religious plurality and to regulate freedom of religion.
¶ 4 Leave a comment on paragraph 4 0 Legal notions of religious practices are derived from legal reasoning and as such “invented”. But “showing that a concept is a social construction says nothing about whether or not that concept identifies something real”, we learn from Kevin Schilbrack. He calls this a „critical realist“ view on concepts. Gustavo Benavides likewise pointed out that the notion of ‘inventing a concept’ suggests wrongly that there are no data, it refers to. The discourse on freedom of religion refers to empirical and historical data and aspects of religion as rituals, religious doctrines, constructions of tradition, formation of religious communities.
¶ 5 Leave a comment on paragraph 5 0 More than 45 years after the UDHR the Human Rights Committee of the UN 1993 in a General Comment No. 22 exemplified what kind of actions claimed as worship, teaching, practice and observance are covered by article 18 and what not. The committee tried delineating the field of freedom of religion.
¶ 6 Leave a comment on paragraph 6 0 22 (4) The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest. The observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head-coverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group. In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts inte-gral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish semin-aries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.
¶ 7 Leave a comment on paragraph 7 0 We notice a preference for common religious activities and institutions giving direct expression to religion to the disadvantage of activities which flow from individual religious convictions.
¶ 8 Leave a comment on paragraph 8 0 Initially in 1948, freedom of religion was a moral right. Subsequently, however, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted in 1966 and ratified in 1976, made the Declaration of Human Rights legally binding on all the contracting member states of the United Nations. It declared the nation-states to be the guarantors of human rights and encouraging a plurality of religions by regulating their cohabitation in one legal system. Freedom of religion becomes a subject of juridification. Law gets competencies on religion; it regulates a number of different religious and secular activities; it is expected to solve religious conflicts. The category of religion is a secular legal concept, construed by legal scholars and politicians and practically enforced by statutes that compel the secular state to allow believers to observe different religious prescriptions. Kocku van Stuckrad has pointed out, that the discourse on religion can integrate other discourses, here a legal one, and vice versa. “We have to take seriously the impact factors (such as ‘materiality’) that are outside of the discourse as well as systems of knowledge” and he defends “the appreciation of a plurality of knowledge systems” . When the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights attributed to the member-states of the UN the task of guaranteeing each citizen the fundamental right to invoke this freedom, it also empowered the states to restrict legally the freedom to manifest religion publicly, provided certain national conditions are fulfilled.
ICCPR article 18 (3): Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
¶ 9 Leave a comment on paragraph 9 0 There are thus three criteria: national laws forbidding the manifestations (legality); prohibitions justified to protect the common good of society (its internal security, its morality, its health, the basic rights and freedoms of other persons) (legitimacy); and their necessity. The judgment about the three criteria was dependent on the nation-states and allowed them to integrate religions in agreement of state interests.
¶ 10 Leave a comment on paragraph 10 0 This juridification altered the familiar categories of “religion” and “public sphere.” If religion counts as a purely private matter, the public sphere can be purely secular. But if this sphere becomes the place where manifestations of religions rightly take place, religion too becomes public (public religion), thereby modifying the alleged secular character of public space. Habermas’ notions of religion in a “post-secular society” and the notion of a “public religion” of Casanova have here their legal equivalents. Religion is subject to the regulation of the secular state in the service of the public welfare. As Saba Mahmood has shown in a sophisticated study, religious difference is conceived in secular terms.
¶ 11 Leave a comment on paragraph 11 0 At the time when the ICCPR was being discussed in the United Nations, a study was published in the name of the “Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities” of the Committee on Human Rights (1960). Its author, Arcot Krishnaswami, investigated cases of discrimination of the freedom to manifest religion throughout the world, by inquiring with concerned believers. Since he regarded religious communities as an embodiment of the spirit of fraternity and peace of the UN, he identified communal religious practices that, from this perspective, were unjustly or justly prohibited. Practices as human sacrifice, mutilation, slavery, prostitution, the formation of a caste of untouchables or suttee/ sati (funeral custom where a widow immolates herself on her husband’s pyre) are excluded from legal protection, since they are “so obviously contrary to morality, public order, or the general welfare that public authorities are always entitled to limit them, or even to prohibit them altogether”. On the other hand he compiled a catalogue of actions, complying with what is prescribed or authorized by a religion or belief namely: worship, processions, pilgrimages, equipment and symbols, arrangements for disposal of the dead, observance of holidays and days of rest, dietary practices, celebration of marriage and its dissolution by divorce, celebration of marriage, dissemination of religion or belief, training of personnel. When the nation-state subjected these practices to state control, religious adherents and likewise Krishnaswami regarded state intervention as unjustified and discrimination. Here a broad notion of religion emerged, not based on a definition like that of the Human Rights Committee, but on variety of claims of believers, supported by Krishnaswami, that their practices were religious and socially beneficial. The claims of the religious adherents were crucial for limiting the field of freedom of religion. Already Wilfred Cantwell Smith had argued, that not the noun ‘religion’ should be studied and defined but the social practices qualified by believers as religious. Talal Asad has renewed his assumption to think of religion as adjective. The concept of religion is an adjective of practices that are not religious in themselves. “Religious”―in philosophical language―is not an analytic but a synthetic notiony.
¶ 12 Leave a comment on paragraph 12 0 Krishnaswami’s catalogue and his 16 basic rules for legislation on religion later formed the basis of the UN “Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief” (1981). The preamble of the declaration expresses its appreciation for religion as „conception of life”. “Disregard and infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms … have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind”. “Religion or belief is one of the fundamental elements in the conception of life and freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and guaranteed”, “considering that it is essential to promote understanding, tolerance and respect”. To do without defining religion and focusing instead on it as subjective principle (religiosity), expanded the cases of actions that are unjustly prohibited.
¶ 13 Leave a comment on paragraph 13 0 The declaration authorizes religious communities to carry out a variety of social activities, and gives them legal protection for the foundation of charitable or humanitarian organizations and for the dissemination of publications; they are entitled to receive donations, to train ministers of religion, and to maintain both national and international relations.
¶ 14 Leave a comment on paragraph 14 0 These rights generated a new social reality of religion. In the Netherlands, the outcome of a practice that transferred these religious rights into a social reality has been called “pillarization” (“Versäulung” in German); religions are shaping the cultural, civil and communicative sector of a society; M. Rainer Lepsius has coined the notion “social-moral milieu”, indicating a fusion of region, economy, values and religion that had effect on national elections; Gunnar Folke Schuppert speaks of “religious governance”; religion is establishing a public sphere of its own that could act independently of state institutions. In all these cases religious institutions could potentially act in rivalry or competition with the state.
¶ 15 Leave a comment on paragraph 15 0 The article on freedom of religion in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) balanced a freedom of the choice of a faith (including the freedom to apostatize) with a freedom to manifest one’s faith (including providing humanitarian organizations). „Rights of the source, rights of the target” as Tad Stahnke put it. But the balance between both began to tilt in the course of the years. The Committee on Human Rights discussed in 1993 the question of which coercion was prohibited by article 18 (2) of the ICCPR.
ICCPR Art. 18 (2): No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
¶ 16 Leave a comment on paragraph 16 0 Its comment 22, 5 refers to physical violence or penal sanctions, but also to “limiting access to education, medical care, work, or to participation in the political process.” The authorization of social services has made the religious communities powerful national and global actors, but thereby also potential partisans in political, societal, and religious conflicts. An unfair proselytism was not content just to propagate the faith: it also promised in case of conversion advantages. A number of further declarations by the General Assembly of the UN spoke out against any kind of intolerance and discrimination, and above all, against the violence against citizens of different religions and belief―violence that was given a religious justification. This debate became increasingly intense and fundamental in the last decade of the twentieth century and the first two decades of the twenty-first, as the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief shows.
¶ 17 Leave a comment on paragraph 17 0 Despite this reserved evaluation of their social activities, religious communities were recognized and accredited by the UN as national and international religious Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and thus as partners in the realization of fraternity and peace, the main goals of the UN. Initially, it was Christian associations that were recognized as partners; from the 1980s onwards, Islamic associations and those of other religions followed suit. In 2003 e.g., the religious NGOs amounted to 10% of a total of ca. 3,000 NGOs with consultative status in the UN. This percentage holds true for later years also. Though these religious associations were granted autonomy in all their activities, there was still a necessity to orchestrate their activities for the benefit of the goals of the UN. The discourse on religion has fundamentally expanded in this process, as Karsten Lehmann has shown. Freedom of religion, once directed against a close link between state and church, has become a requirement for religious communities, to act independently from the state and tolerantly in secular social and political fields.
¶ 18 Leave a comment on paragraph 18 0 The USA too propagated globally in its foreign policy the granting of religious freedom, but enforced this abroad through violence and coercion. They thereby helped the American missionary Christian organizations (the Pentecostal movement, fundamentalism, the sister church movement) to gain an entrance into countries with foreign religion. Islamic countries rejected the Christian mission as a threat to their societal cohesion, and increased the penalty for apostasy. Islamic NGOs, which took the side of Muslims in political conflicts and gave their coreligionists aid and support in their jihad against the infidels (in Afghanistan; Palestine; Bosnia; Chechnya), were banned by the US. In view of the worldwide phenomenon of religious violence in all great religions from the end of the 1970s onwards, the Human Rights Council of the UN resolved in the 2013 Rabat Plan to specify the conditions under which religions that are otherwise peaceful can become violent. The international law concerning freedom of religion has become a source of political, social and legal conflicts.
¶ 19 Leave a comment on paragraph 19 0 A special issue in an analysis of the discourse on freedom of religion as a global fundamental right is the question of how this right, which claimed universal validity, became the protector of local, particular religious practices. Which of these practices were covered by it, and which were not? Krishnaswami had already excluded certain practices as damaging the benefit of a society. But what qualified other contingent religious practices to be protected by the human right to freedom of religion?
¶ 20 Leave a comment on paragraph 20 0 The manner of the genesis of the standard of the “human right” was itself already contingent. Its two specific origins, in France and in the USA, had different roots, namely, the philosophy of the French Enlightenment and American Nonconformist Protestantism. Neither Judaism nor Christianity nor Islam nor other religions or cultures had acknowledged a concept of universal human rights that are antecedent to the state. And when the concept was finally developed, it was necessary to determine who was entitled to this right: only the male citizens, or also women; only the free, or also the slaves; only citizens, or also foreigners and refugees? And to what were they entitled, when they benefited from the human right? Down to the present day, studies of human rights are obliged to confront the problem of the contingency of a claim to universal validity.
¶ 21 Leave a comment on paragraph 21 0 Several solutions have been proposed in the course of time. Jack Donnelly, one of the experts in this field, argues that the concept of human dignity, which arose in the West, should be accorded universal validity. It is possible everywhere to appeal to the concept, but this does not ensure everywhere the same substantial rights. This means that human rights are both universal―the authorization of claims―and particular, since the contents of these claims differ from one epoch and culture to another.
¶ 22 Leave a comment on paragraph 22 0 There is another empirical approach to this kind of nexus between the universality of a claim and the particularity of its implementation: namely, to see human rights as enforceable basic rights. Christoph Menke has presented this approach, pointing to the special public legal relationship between the individual and the state, which was established through the juridification of the human right and led to a new definition of the right to take legal action. The individual can appeal to a competent national court or, at the next stage, to the human rights committee or to a transnational court, if he believes that his or her subjective rights are infringed by the nation-state. Menke develops a distinction that was first made by Michael Walzer: human rights do not lay claim to acceptance by all human beings as a “fully comprehensive law”; they lay claim to a “continually changing and regenerating repetition,” to an exemplary quality. The human rights are differentiated in this process. One and the same claim will be realized in differing particular practices, if the complaint is successful.
¶ 23 Leave a comment on paragraph 23 0 When the European Human Rights Convention was approved by the European Council in 1950 and came into force in 1953, the contracting states agreed that according Article 19 a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) should be set up and according Article 34 and 35 may receive applications from persons or organizations claiming to be victims of violations of their right. Its task would be the revision of appeals that people made against sentences of national courts, asserting that their rights had been violated. They could appeal here against what they saw as unjustified verdicts that restricted the freedom to manifest their religion and conviction. 213 verdicts were issued between 1962 and 2012.
¶ 24 Leave a comment on paragraph 24 0 The court was faced with the problem that not only the understanding of morality and religion, but also the constitutions of the contracting states, were different. It was necessary to have some leeway, in order to acknowledge differences between the nations when evaluating complaints about alleged violations of human rights. The court found a solution by according the national authorities a “margin of appreciation” in restricting the public manifestation of moral and religious practices and convictions. The complaint of a British publisher against banning his school-textbook in England, which was intended to teach the pupils the facts of life, particularly sexual ones, was rejected, on the grounds that the book was inappropriate for English pupils for moral reasons; similarly, the complaint against the refusal of a license to show a film in Austria, on the grounds that it offended the religious feelings of Austrian Catholics, was rejected. The judges held that the national authorities were better able than the European Court to assess the moral or religious necessities of a ban. This prompted vigorous discussions about the consideration given in the verdicts to the views of national minorities.
¶ 25 Leave a comment on paragraph 25 0 On the other hand, with a view to the realization of human rights in the contracting states, the Court made some exemplary cases precedents for future sentences. It took decisions about which public manifestations of religion offended freedom of religion and were inadmissible, and about when this was the case (for example, the obligation to take a special religious oath when assuming an office in the state). When a pacifist protested against the use of English troops in Northern Ireland by calling on them to refuse to serve, she was found guilty by an English court, but her appeal to Strasbourg did not help her. The majority of the judges held that only private convictions were covered, not the action of handing out leaflets with an open appeal to desertion.
¶ 26 Leave a comment on paragraph 26 0 Various appeals the European Court of Human Rights ensured the independence of religious communities from interventions by the state and made their autonomy inviolable. The validity of religious freedom in states that had an official state-church was also the object of a court case that has repeatedly been cited as a precedent (Kokkinakis against Greece 1993). The mutual tolerance between citizens of different faiths, which is demanded by the human right to freedom of religion, was weightier than obeying the specific kind of constitution (state religion; laicism; cooperation by state and church). In view of the religious plurality of the European nation states, the court saw its task as protecting religious pluralism, and thereby the democracy of the citizens. In this way, the tension between universal human rights and local practices was resolved in Europe. It was the task of the state to enable and even foster religious pluralism. Malcolm D. Evans speaks of “the state’s responsibility as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of religions, faiths and beliefs”, “the state as ‘facilitator of organizational and individual religious freedom’”. The discourse on freedom of religion had consequences for the understanding of the function of the state.
¶ 27 Leave a comment on paragraph 27 0 However, the intricacy was intensified through the increase of religions of migrants. Those who did not wish their children to have a Christian education complained about Christian practices such as having crosses in state schools of Italy. When the state in question rejected this complaint, they appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. Despite initial wavering, the court ultimately approved of the praxis of the state. The migration of Muslims to Europe led to new claims of public manifestations of a foreign religion. Islamic migrants claimed that their religious practices were local concretizations of the universal standard of the freedom to manifest religion and belief. The European Court did not reach a common mind on the evaluation of these claims. Does not Islam contradict the human rights norms of a plurality of religions in the public sphere, as its ban on apostasy shows?
¶ 28 Leave a comment on paragraph 28 0 Particularly instructive for the kind of religion under the human rights law is a new interpretation of the prohibition of blasphemy in European case-law and in the UN. In 1976, the English publisher of a gay periodical was condemned for disseminating a blasphemous libel. When Muslims referred to this case in their demand for a prohibition of the dissemination of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses, this was dismissed with the affirmation that the prohibition of blasphemy protected only Christianity. The ECHR dismissed an appeal against this verdict. But a new interpretation of the prohibitions against blasphemy could already be discerned in his treatment of Christian cases. The protection offered by the blasphemy law, doesn’t extend to the religion itself, but to its believers (including the non-Christian believers), and is meant to protect them against the public fomentation of hatred. Not the criticism of religion was forbidden, but the call to hatred against members of other religions. Indeed, the criticism of religion must be permitted.
¶ 29 Leave a comment on paragraph 29 0 Nilüfer Göle has given a new form to the European dilemma that can be seen here. Controversies about Islamic practices have broken out again and again in the European public sphere; sometimes, they have been intensified by legal verdicts. Nilüfer Göle and her collaborators have examined these controversies in places where they once had raged and have brought those involved to sit together around a table, with the intention of forming an “experimental public sphere” in which they could discuss once more the disputed facts of the case. In this way, they transformed the controversial phenomena into a new public sphere that was shared by the non-European migrants and the other Europeans.
¶ 30 Leave a comment on paragraph 30 0 These unresolved controversies can be linked to studies concerning the special characteristics of Europe’s culture and its nation-states. Rémi Brague regards Europe’s identity as “ex-centric,” since it lies, not in Europe itself, but outside Europe, in Greece and the Middle East. The fact that Greek culture and the religions of Judaism and Christianity (and later, Islam) entered the Western sphere from the eastern Mediterranean region and remained perennial markers of orientation for the culture of the inhabitants of the West, has contributed to the formation of this cultural consciousness. Similarly, Edgar Morin sees the unity of Europe as consisting in a complexity that unites great differences within itself, without blending them. He lists the numerous contradictions between religion and reason, faith and doubt, mythical and critical thinking, and other antagonisms, and describes their interactions as perennial dialogue situations. One could apply the same model to the European discourse of human rights with regard to freedom of religion. It has promoted an antagonistic pluralism.
¶ 31 Leave a comment on paragraph 31 0 The Human Rights discourse on freedom of religion has developed since 1948 along the public manifestations of religion. The legal frame transformed a private faith into a public performance¸ the public performance shaped the private belief. Teaching, practice, worship and observance are religious activities that happen to take place among citizens of a secular society; the issues of the secular society shape private commitments. The interaction between religious activist and their social environment became the point of departure of new religious institutions and discourses: believers teach world views rejecting the state; they run social institutions independent of the state; they produce networks and media of their own, inside nation-states and beyond national borders; they observe customs of their own independent of the habits of the majority of the inhabitants. In this process of an emerging public religion the concept of religion cannot be subject of a definition, since it includes activities that were not acknowledged by everybody as religious; the ensuing conflicts contributed to an increasing split in nation-states and between them. Religions and their position in society became a disputed issue.
¶ 32 Leave a comment on paragraph 32 0 When we address the general discourse on the article freedom of religion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN, we see that the positive evaluation of the religious communities as bearers of the values of fraternity and peace enabled religious communities to expand their activities to new societal areas. They could become accredited as powerful Non-Governmental Organizations and partners of the UN. As soon as this happened, however, some of them were drawn into national and international political conflicts. One declaration after the other of the General Assembly of the UN summoned the nation-states and religious communities to take action against discrimination and intolerance, without lasting success. The necessity of regulating freedom of religion altered the position of religions in the world of the nation-states.
¶ 33 Leave a comment on paragraph 33 0 In Europe the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms developed legal instruments that made it possible to acknowledge different religious practices in worship, teaching, practice and observance as protected by human right. It established the plurality of religions in one and the same state/society, enabled the integration of migrants of Islamic belief; when trying to generate standards for their public role, they stimulate conflicts among citizens.
¶ 34 Leave a comment on paragraph 34 0  An eminently valuable collection of sources and commentaries by Heiner Bielefeldt/ Nazila Ghanea/ Michael Wiener, Freedom of Religion and Belief. An International Law Commentary. Oxford: UP 2016.
¶ 35 Leave a comment on paragraph 35 0  Helge rsheim, „Whose Religion? Whose Freedom? Discursive Constructions in the Work of UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief“. In: Kocku van Stuckrad/ Frans Wijsen (eds), Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion. Leiden: Brill 2016, 287–316.
¶ 36 Leave a comment on paragraph 36 0  Hans G. Kippenberg, Regulierungen der Religionsfreiheit. Von der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte zu den Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2019.
¶ 37 Leave a comment on paragraph 37 0  Clifford Geertz, “Local Knowledge. Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective”. In: Ders., Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books 1983, 167–234, quotation 184.
¶ 39 Leave a comment on paragraph 39 0  “Regulation” denotes an intervention by the state to maintain for example free markets. This is a process policy that is intended to reduce through state intervention the formation of monopolies and the undesired external effects of f.e. economic decisions. In the sphere of religion, the action of the state consists in maintaining the free choice of religion and curbing undesired effects linked to this.
¶ 41 Leave a comment on paragraph 41 0  Gustavo Benavides, “What Raw Materials are used in the Manufacture of Religion?” In: Culture and Religion 1 (2000), 113–122; idem, „There Is data for Religion”. In: JAAR 71 (2003), 895–903.
¶ 42 Leave a comment on paragraph 42 0  Helge Årsheim, Making Religion and Human Rights at the United Nations. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter 2018, 106–112 on the Human Rights Committee and its General Comments, among them 22.
¶ 44 Leave a comment on paragraph 44 0  Kocku van Stuckrad, von, “Religions and Science in Transformation: On Discourse Communities, the Double-Bind of Discourse Research, and Theoretical Controversies”. In: Kocku von Stuckrad/ Frans Wijsen (eds.), Making Religion. Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion. Leiden: Brill 2016, 203–224, 218.
¶ 45 Leave a comment on paragraph 45 0  Jürgen Habermas, „Die Revitalisierung der Weltreligionen – Herausforderung für ein säkulares Selbstverständnis der Moderne?“ In: Ders., Philosophische Texte, Vol. 5. Kritik der Vernunft. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt 2009, 387–407; idem, „‚Das Politische‘ – Der vernünftige Sinn eines zweifelhaften Erbstücks der Politischen Theologie“. In: Eduardo Mendieta/ Jonathan Van Antwerpen (ed.), Religion und Öffentlichkeit. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2012, 28–52; José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: UP 1994.
¶ 47 Leave a comment on paragraph 47 0  Nathan Lerner has proven the close connection between article 18 of the UDHR, Krishnaswami’s study, the ICCR article 18 and the “Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Tolerance and Discrimination” (Natan Lerner, Religion, Beliefs, and International Human Rights. New York: Orbis 2000, 9–39.)
¶ 48 Leave a comment on paragraph 48 0  Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices. UN: New York 1960; URL http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/Krishnaswami_1960.pdf, 24.
¶ 49 Leave a comment on paragraph 49 0  Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (first 1962). Minneapolis: Fortress 1991, see p. 20; Talal Asad, “Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion’”. In: History of Religions 40 (2001), 205–222.
¶ 50 Leave a comment on paragraph 50 0  A/RES/36/55. Source: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm; an interpretation of the declaration by Donna J. Sullivan, „Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Tolerance and Discrimination“, in: American Society of International Law 82 (1988), 487–520.
¶ 51 Leave a comment on paragraph 51 0  Bielefeldt/ Ghanea/ Wiener, Freedom of Religion and Belief, 242–257 (“Establish and Maintain Charitable or Humanitarian Institutions/Solicit and Receive Funding”).
¶ 52 Leave a comment on paragraph 52 0  Arie L. Molendijk, „Versäulung in den Niederlanden: Begriff, Theorie, lieu de mémoire“. In: Friedrich Wilhelm Graf / Klaus Große Kracht (Hg.), Religion und Gesellschaft. Europa im 20. Jahrhundert. Köln: Böhlau 2007, 307–327.
¶ 53 Leave a comment on paragraph 53 0  M. Rainer Lepsius, „Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur: zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft“ (1966), in: Gerhard Albert Ritter (ed.), Deutsche Parteien vor 1918. Köln: Kiepenheuer 1973, 56–80 on p. 6
¶ 57 Leave a comment on paragraph 57 0  Heiner Bielefeldt, Freedom of Religion or Belief; Thematic Reports of the UN Special Rapporteur 2010–2016. Bonn: Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft 2017, 249–278 („Preventing Violence committed in the Name of Religion”).
¶ 58 Leave a comment on paragraph 58 0  Julia Berger, “Religious Non-Governmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis”. In: Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 14 (2003), 15–39; Marie Juul Petersen, “International Religious NGOs at the United Nations: A Study of a Group of Religious Organizations”. In: The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 2010. (https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/847) (aufgerufen 4.7.18); Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity or for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Trans-national Muslim NGOs. London: Hurst & Company 2015; Karsten Lehmann, Religious NGOs in International Relations. The Construction of ‘the religious‘ and ‘the secular‘. Abingdon: Routledge 2016.
¶ 59 Leave a comment on paragraph 59 0  Mark R. Amsturz., Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy. Oxford: UP 2004; Allen D Hertzke, Freeing God’s Children. The Unlikeley Alliance for Global Human Rights. Lanham (Maryland): Rowman 2004.
¶ 62 Leave a comment on paragraph 62 0  Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca/ London: Cornell UP 2003; Jack Donnelly, „Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of ‘Western’ Universalism“. In: Joanne R. Bauer / Daniel A. Bell (eds.), The East Asian Challenge forHuman Rights. Cambridge: UP 1999, 60–87.
¶ 63 Leave a comment on paragraph 63 0  Christoph Menke, „Privatrecht, Klagerecht, Grundrecht. Zur Einheit der modernen Rechtsidee“. In: Der Staat im Recht. Festschrift für Eckart Klein zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2013, 439–452.
¶ 64 Leave a comment on paragraph 64 0  Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame (Indiana): UP 1990. (German translation: Lokale Kritik – globale Standards. Zwei Formen moralischer Auseinandersetzung. Hamburg: Rotbuch 1996).
¶ 65 Leave a comment on paragraph 65 0  Two manuals dealing with two main issues the European Court for Human Rights had to decide: one by Malcolm D. Evans, Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2009 and the other by Anne Weber, Manual on Hate Speech. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing 2009.
¶ 66 Leave a comment on paragraph 66 0  Paul Mahoney, „Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin”. In: Human Rights Law Journal 11 (1990), 57–88; idem, “Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?”. In: Human Rights Law Journal 19(1998), 1–6 (Special issue: “The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention on Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice”).
¶ 69 Leave a comment on paragraph 69 0  Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe. Cambridge: UP 1997, Chapter 11 “The application of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (281–314).
¶ 73 Leave a comment on paragraph 73 0  Remi Brague, Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press 2002 (Franz. 1992). German translation: Europa: eine exzentrische Identität. Frankfurt: Campus 1993.